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Abstract: This article focuses on the DaimlerChrysler/Mitsubishi merger of 
2000 and discusses the failed attempt by a European-American multinational 
firm to break into the Asian market, a region where previously it had  
an extremely limited presence. Having completed its 1998 merger with the  
US-based Chrysler Corporation, the newly formed DaimlerChrysler group 
turned its attention to the Asian market in 2000 in an attempt to become a truly 
global competitor. Partnership with the Japanese motor firm offered the 
possibility of economies of scale and scope, in particular in the sub-compact 
car market to enable DaimlerChrysler to become a full-scale producer. 
However, within four years the dream of large scale trans-national production 
was over. The failure to integrate with the Japanese company and the 
subsequent decision to cut Mitsubishi Motors adrift led to the dismissal of the 
DaimlerChrysler CEO Jürgen Schrempp. This paper will focus on outlining the 
motives behind the merger, why it failed, and why the Board of Daimler-Benz 
decided to end the relationship and extricate itself from Mitsubishi’s problems. 
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1 Introduction 
Having completed its 1998 merger with the US-based Chrysler Corporation, the newly 
formed DaimlerChrysler group turned its attention to the Asian market in 2000 and 
merged with the Mitsubishi Motor Corporation of Japan in an attempt to become a global 
competitor in an increasingly competitive market. Such a partnership offered the 
possibilities of economies of scale and scope particularly in the sub-compact car market 
where Daimler was weak. Important, too, was DaimlerChrysler’s aim to gain greater 
access to the wider Asian market and produce a wide range of vehicles using the 
expertise of their European, US and Asian arms. Within four years, however, the dream 
of trans-national production on the scale of Ford, General Motors (GM) and Toyota had 
fallen apart. Stock value had imploded, profits were dwindling and the group was heavily 
in debt. The failure to integrate with the Japanese company and the subsequent decision 
to cut Mitsubishi Motors adrift contributed heavily to the departure of the 
DaimlerChrysler CEO Jürgen Schrempp. 
Why then did DaimlerChrysler’s gambit prove unsuccessful? What factors lead to the 
downturn in profitability and the collapse of the partnership? This case study assesses the 
DaimlerChrysler-Mitsubishi merger of 2000, outlining the motives behind the acquisition 
from both a European and Asian corporate perspective. It attempts to place the problems 
faced by the group after the merger in a global context. It also demonstrates the 
consequences of the failure of Daimler-Benz’s management to deal effectively with the 
twin difficulties of trying to make both Chrysler and Mitsubishi profitable. In turn this 
drained Daimler’s managerial resource base to the extent that the very existence of 
Daimler Benz seemed threatened and ultimately led to the Japanese firm being cut adrift, 
heralding the end of Schrempp’s reign in Stuttgart 
2 Literature review 
A great deal has been expounded on mergers in manufacturing industry and the 
automotive industry is no exception. In discussing mergers two key elements stand out: 
the rationale behind mergers and the pre-and post-merger strategies of the acquiring firm. 
Beginning with the first, it is generally agreed that the ultimate objective of a merger – or 
in some cases a take-over – is survival in an increasingly competitive and yet fragmenting 
global economy as firms seek to expand in size and scale to ensure their future. 
It could be argued that mergers and acquisitions have become a key method of firm 
growth and expansion as it is cheaper and quicker than organic growth. Mergers differ 
from acquisitions in so far as they are the product of mutual consent between the 
respective firms and often simply involve an exchange of shares. Acquisition involves 
one firm taking over another following a successful bid for its shares. Such a move, 
though often viewed as hostile, can in some cases be welcomed by troubled firms seeking 
rescue to from impending failure (Capron, 1999). 
There are different types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, lateral and conglomerate. Of 
these the only one of direct relevance to the discussion is the second as all the companies 
under immediate scrutiny were at the same stage of production, namely final automotive 
assembly. The attractions of horizontal mergers, whether offensive or defensive, are 
manifold. Firms may seek to acquire access to products and markets/segments through 
the elimination of competitors; they may also desire access to new or different 
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technologies, skills, distribution channels and so increase their economies of scale, scope 
and competitive power through increasing synergies, especially in times of increasing 
industrial consolidation to enable them to fend off potential predators. In other words, the 
key rationale fostering merger activity focuses primarily on strategic issues (Graebner 
and Eisenhardt, 2004). 
Mergers and takeovers have not by any means proved a panacea for solving industrial 
problems as many fail to achieve the goals originally envisaged (Cartwright and 
Shoenberg, 2006). Often the expected gains from expected synergies in finance, 
technology, administration and research and development fail to emerge and share prices 
languish below what they were at the time of the original merger for a number of years. 
As Capron (1999), argues, it is probably easier to achieve synergies in marketing than in 
innovatory capabilities in manufacturing and production due to products being at 
different stages in the development cycles as Ford found in trying to manage its Premier 
Automotive Group. Indeed it might take as long as a decade or more for real synergies 
and benefits to emerge fully (Donnelly and Morris, 2003). 
As history has shown, the merger process is often neither simple nor straightforward. 
Howell (1970), however, advocates that there are three key stages: target identification 
and selection; negotiation; and integration. At the pre-merger phase, care must be 
exercised over the choice of partner in terms of organisational fit and, if a merger is to be 
championed, then it must involve senior management and possibly key operational 
managers, whether or not outside consultants/advisors are used, as operational managers 
might well be better aware of the more mundane issues that might arise than professional 
consultants. Additionally, a period of ‘courtship’ or ‘getting to know you’ as a 
demonstration of respect might help firms to assess each other’s capabilities. This worked 
particularly well for Renault-Nissan, but failed for Renault-Volvo in the early 1990s 
when, after a two-year period of courtship, the Swedes called off the marriage (Donnelly 
et al., 2004). Bound up with this is an evaluation of each firm’s strengths and weaknesses 
not just in terms of products and capabilities but also of the management team of the firm 
to be inherited. This can help an acquirer to arrive at a decision on what price to pay 
rather than offer a premium price as Ford paid for Jaguar in an attempt to close the deal 
quickly and fend off a possible rival bid from GM. Moreover, courtship can often assist 
in clarifying how much investment might be required to improve a weaker firm as the 
amount of investment needed might be underestimated and vitiate any post-merger 
strategy (Gomes et al., 2007). 
Of the two key phases, post-merger implementation strategy is the most difficult to 
operate. No two mergers are alike and so implementation strategies vary accordingly, but 
in theory should reflect the rationale behind the merger (Mitleton-Kelly, 2004). In 
mergers enacted purely for financial reasons, it is likely that the firm acquired will be left 
with a high degree of autonomy, but where there is the necessity to achieve gains from 
manufacturing then a significant degree of integration is essential. 
The ultimate responsibility for implementing post merger strategy lies with the senior 
management of the acquiring firm, who have three choices: motivate the existing 
management team, bring in an entirely new team or create a new management team 
drawn from both firms. Whichever method is adopted it is essential that team members 
play complementary roles to achieve change whether this be in culture, behavioural 
patterns, human resource management practices, operating procedures and so forth. This 
is vital if at the early stages decisions on plant closures, redundancies and new 
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relationships are in the offing. In other words what is to be done should be effected 
quickly with clear communication and without ambiguity. 
It is at this juncture that decisive leadership is essential, because as Prittchet et al. 
(1996) argue, failure in post merger strategy implementation often leads to stress and 
anxiety among the work force with key and talented figures in the management structure 
leaving for other jobs and replacing these people may prove expensive. Instead, key 
personnel should be offered attractive reward packages to ensure that they remain with 
the firm (Aslinger and Copeland, 1996). Finally, there are often cultural difficulties to be 
resolved and again this is down to the quality of leadership. Senior management must 
show respect and sensitivity towards genuine differences and cultural practices and try to 
avoid anything that might be construed as cultural imperialism by paying close attention 
to legal systems, symbols and social norms (Ghosn, 2002). 
3 The DaimlerChrysler Mitsubishi merger 
Any understanding of the above merger needs to be contextualised within the major 
trends in merger and consolidation that occurred in the global automotive industry from 
the late 1980s onwards. In the search for a global presence, international cross border 
mergers were a key feature of the major automotive companies. Additionally, as markets 
became more competitive, consumers, who were increasingly both financially and 
information rich, sought an increasing variety of vehicles to fit in with their lifestyles. In 
consequence markets fragmented and this was aided by the advent of flexible production 
methods which encouraged manufacturers to produce a variety of vehicles to meet ever 
growing and diversified demand patterns through economies of scale and scope. 
As a result the major firms searched for a presence not just in all major geographic 
markets, but in each market segment from small volume models to their luxury 
counterparts. Achieving this type of growth presented a choice: organic growth or growth 
by acquisition and merger. The former, which was pursued by Toyota when it created 
Lexus as a separate brand was slow and expensive, whereas the latter offered a cheaper 
and quicker option. This pattern can be illustrated easily in the series of acquisitions 
made by Ford, Volkswagen and GM. In the light of this growing trend Daimler-Benz 
decided to follow suit by merging with Chrysler of America in 1998 and two years later 
with Mitsubishi of Japan to avoid the possibility of becoming vulnerable to possible 
predators (Dicken, 2007; Morris and Donnelly, 2006). 
After five financially troubled years of partnership DaimlerChrysler finally 
relinquished its remaining shares in the Mitsubishi Motor Corporation on 11 November 
2005. In so doing, it effectively ended the company’s ambition to create a truly global car 
company. The eventual collapse was not unexpected. At the time of the merger 
contemporary analysts had expressed their misgivings, remaining undecided whether the 
move was “shrewd or desperate” (Priddle, 2000). Regardless of optimistic views 
expressed at the time by DaimlerChrysler, the venture proved a failure. It is primarily for 
these reasons that this article explores the logic behind the merger in the first place, the 
leadership role played by Schrempp and ultimately explaining why the merger failed. 
Schrempp’s rise from the position of mechanic at a Mercedes Branch in Southern 
Germany to the head of Europe’s largest industrial enterprise is already well documented 
and need not be recounted here (see Grässlin, 2000). In May 1995 Schrempp assumed 
leadership of Daimler-Benz from Edzard Reuter and inherited a firm which was highly 
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diversified, but poorly integrated and afflicted by large, spiralling debts. A period of 
restructuring, involving the sale of non-core businesses such as the firm’s aircraft 
division, was overseen by Schrempp, and culminated in 1998 with the decision to 
complete a merger with the US-based Chrysler Corporation. The deal, completed in  
May 1998, was Schrempp’s brainchild and was in keeping with his desire to turn 
Daimler-Benz into a global brand name by initially gaining a foothold in the  
North American market. In a $38 billion stock deal Chrysler’s shareholders received 
DaimlerChrysler stock at a rate of 0.6235 per share (approximately 42% of the company), 
while Daimler-Benz’s shareholders received DaimlerChrysler shares at a rate of  
one-to-one and a bonus of .005 of a share per share (Week in Germany, 1998).1 
Though mooted as a merger of equals with a good product/market strategic fit, the 
truth was that from the beginning the Germans were the dominant force in the new entity. 
For example, the stock valuation of Daimler-Benz at almost twice that of Chrysler 
demonstrated the superior partner status of the German company. Moreover, the decision 
to locate the headquarters of the new group in Germany and the speedy marginalisation 
of the Chrysler chairman, Robert Eaton, only served to underline this point. The 
Americans soon realised that they were regarded as the junior partner. The driving force 
behind the new company would instead be the Daimler-Benz chairman,  
Jürgen Schrempp (Gomes et al., 2010 forthcoming). 
DaimlerChrysler was now the world’s third largest automaker, trailing only GM and 
Ford in output. Their respective products were for the most part not in direct competition, 
but were complementary to each other, giving the firm a model in virtually every product 
segment and in the key European and North American markets, Chrysler would 
concentrate on the volume market and Daimler on the luxury. The combined 
DaimlerChrysler work force numbered approximately 428,000, and was expected to 
produce 4.4 million vehicles per annum (Business Week, 1999). Yet, Schrempp’s 
ambitions for the new DaimlerChrysler group did not end here. Specifically, gaining a 
foothold in the Asian market now became a priority. Without any internal opposition and 
enjoying the support of his board, Schrempp was able to pursue an acquisition policy to 
build a worldwide presence in the automotive market. 
4 Towards a global brand; DaimlerChrysler and the Asian market 
Penetration of the Asian market predated Schrempp’s leadership of Daimler-Benz. In the 
mid 1990s Daimler’s board of management had expressed its aspirations for expansion 
into China, Japan and other Asian countries. It was envisaged that by 2005 Daimler sales 
would rise to $21 billion dollars in the region, but it was recognised that this would be 
extremely difficult without taking over or forming a strategic alliance with an existing 
Asian firm as Ford had done with Mazda and GM with Isuzu (Grässlin, 2000). In 1999 
Schrempp openly speculated that DaimlerChrysler’s 1.3% of the Asian market would rise 
to 10%, but did not offer a time-line on when this might happen (Ewing et al., 1999). 
The horizontal acquisition of an Asian-based firm by DaimlerChrysler offered the 
corporation definite advantages such as: the possibility of achieving a global market 
presence; access to new markets or segments; the possession of an established brand 
name which would facilitate deeper penetration of Far Eastern markets while at the same 
time raising Mitsubishi’s profile in Europe. Envisaged, too, was cooperation in 
technologies leading to new models and cost reductions through synergies and greater 
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economies of scale arising from shared assets (Paul, 2008). However, it should be 
stressed that perhaps the lure of new technologies, techniques and processes, as well as 
the benefit of even greater economies of scale and scope can often make the most 
cautious and conservative of companies almost reckless. In the case of DaimlerChrysler 
the temptation of achieving a market share in the Asian arena may have caused it to  
over-extend itself in its dealings with Mitsubishi Motors and less than diligent in its 
evaluation of the target company at a time when many of the difficulties in fusing 
Mercedes and Chrysler had yet to be resolved. 
The first move toward a business partnership with Mitsubishi had occurred under the 
leadership of Schrempp’s immediate predecessor, Werner Reuter, who had begun a series 
of negotiations with Mitsubishi Motor Corporation aimed at forging a closer alliance 
between the two companies. However, by the mid 90s the Japanese market had entered 
recession as automobile sales generally in the Far East fell by 7%, discouraging Daimler 
from becoming further embroiled (Grässlin, 2000). 
The attraction of merging with Mitsubishi Motors lay not only in market penetration, 
but in the designing and development of medium sized and small car technologies that 
would assist Daimler in an area where its own skills and expertise were weak, ably 
illustrated by the early days of the Smart car, for example. The original concept – a small, 
cheap, lightweight sub-compact car had proved an unpopular product and initial sales 
disappointed. By 1999 DaimlerChrysler were looking to find a partner to provide 
expertise in this type of small car technology and a new platform that would allow the car 
to be revamped (Jennings, 1999). In this respect Mitsubishi’s knowledge in the field of 
development, production and distribution of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles 
made partnership with the Japanese firm even more attractive (Schmid, 2000). The 
remaining question is why were the Japanese open to DaimlerChrysler’s overtures. 
5 The Mitsubishi Motors Corporation 
Mitsubishi’s involvement in the automotive industry dates back as far as 1917, when 
Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. first introduced the Mitsubishi Model A. However it 
was not until the post-Second World War years, after the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
conglomerate was divided into three regional companies by the occupying allied forces, 
that major strides in motor vehicle development were made. The growth in commercial 
vehicles and family motoring meant the company would enjoy particular success in the 
sub-compact market with the Minica and Colt models. Following the success of the 
Mitsubishi Galant in 1969 the company decided to create a single operation focusing 
solely on the automotive industry under the name of Mitsubishi Motors in 1970. Success 
in the domestic market led to a focus on exports and forging alliances with foreign firms 
such as Chrysler which purchased 15% of the Mitsubishi Motor Corporation in 1971. 
Chrysler now began selling Galants in the USA under the title of Dodge Colt. The net 
result for Mitsubishi Motors was to increase annual motor production beyond 250,000 
vehicles per annum. This alliance lasted until the late 1980s when growing competition 
saw relations become strained between the two companies. Despite this tension, 
cooperation continued until 1993 when in a mutual agreement Chrysler divested itself of 
its Mitsubishi shares. The companies, however, retained close links and it was these that 
were subsequently exploited by the DaimlerChrysler group when the merger with 
Japanese company was first mooted (Schmid, 2001). 
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That the Mitsubishi Motors Corporation would prove receptive to the 
DaimlerChrysler overtures by the end of the millennium can largely be explained by the 
economic recession in South-East Asian from the middle of the 1990s onwards. The 
downturn in the Asian market was felt by other Japanese automotive firms such as 
Toyota and Honda (Toyo Keizai, 2000). Their losses, however, were offset by their 
significant presence in foreign markets. Mitsubishi, in comparison, focused to a greater 
extent on Asian markets and suffered in consequence. In 1997 the company posted a debt 
of Y1.7 trillion yen ($14.2 bn), the worst losses in its history, and was forced to close 
indefinitely its Thai truck plant, which normally produced 8,700 vehicles annually. A 
severe restructuring plan aimed at cutting costs by Y350 billion yen ($3bn) as well as 
trimming the workforce by 1,400 workers, failed to arrest the slide and the  
company suffered a net loss of Y101,846 million yen ($855 mn) in March 1998  
(Mitsubishi Motors, 1998). 
It became clear that the only way for Mitsubishi to survive the deepening economic 
recession and ensure its future was either to seek out new markets abroad or forge a 
relationship with a foreign partner. Of the two options, the latter was considered the more 
feasible in the short term. It was suggested that the company offer itself as a take-over 
target, but this was rejected by company chairman, Katsuhio Kawaose, who preferred to 
see the company as an equal to others rather than one requiring rescue. In this context, 
and despite the enormous losses, the possibility of a tie-up with Mitsubishi Motors made 
good business sense from the perspective of a Western investor like DaimlerChrysler as it 
pushed open the doors to the Far East even further with an established and respected 
Japanese firm (Nikkei, 1998; Diamond 2000). 
What was significant was that while the Japanese were posting heavy losses, sales in 
the US market proved relatively buoyant and it may well have been this factor, along 
with the relatively close relations with Chrysler that encouraged DaimlerChrysler to 
purchase a 34% stake ($2.1 billion) in the Japanese firm in May 2000. The cost though 
was offset by the sale of a 50.1% stake in Debis Systemhaus GmbH to Deutsche Telekom 
AG. Yet the deal still represented a risk to Daimler-Chrysler so soon after their recent 
merger, Chrysler’s operating losses of €1.1 million at the start of the Millenium and the 
subsequent slow pace of inter-company restructuring and integration due to serious 
tension created by cultural and behavioural differences. Indeed, this latter fact caused 
several Daimler Board members to harbour misgivings about investing in Mitsubishi, 
seeing it as too much of a potential risk due to its secretive culture and the derogatory 
attitude exhibited by some management cadres towards female employees, which on 
occasions spilled over into sexual harassment (Wilmsen, 1998). However, in explaining 
the strategic rationale for the new relationship, board member Professor Juergen Hubbert 
said: 
“We have the product for all worldwide markets, in all worldwide segments, if 
we do it right. Then we can build a portfolio of products from entry to upper 
luxury. The capacity they have in Asia, combined with some of the Koreans, in 
whom they have a stake, and (Malaysia’s) Proton, this offers us a lot of 
opportunities if we do things right.” (Eisenstein, 2005) 
While Hubbert accepted that the takeover of Mitsubishi was not without its challenges, 
the possibility of creating a global brand remained a tempting prize, particularly with 
potential of acquiring small car technology and the lucrative markets this would open. 
Indeed, to augment this, Daimler Chrysler also took a 10% interest in Hyundai, 
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Mitsubishi’s Korean partner, with a view towards developing small trucks and cars. 
However, almost immediately the new enterprise was put to the test even before any 
implementation strategy could begin. 
6 From merger to demerger 
The merger between DaimlerChrysler and Mitsubishi failed and the reasons for this 
cannot be disentangled from the Chrysler’s problems in the USA and Daimler’s problems 
in its heartland. From the outset Mitsubishi’s weaknesses were considerable. In addition 
to its poor financial performance (Table 1) it suffered from a excessive product range, too 
many models in each segment, a weak market image and from serious deficiencies in the 
quality of its manufacturing facilities. The official relationship between the two firms had 
barely been instigated when problems began to reveal themselves. Between July and 
August a million vehicles had to be recalled due to faults being exposed, causing the 
firm’s share price to drop by 30%. The following month CEO Katsuhiko Kawasoe was 
forced to resign after Mitsubishi admitted publicly to covering up defect problems in its 
cars (Diamond, 2000). 
As far back as 1977 the firm had been secretly repairing its cars instead of reporting 
the problems to the Japanese Transport Ministry. The failure to make the ministry aware 
of customer complaints prompted the Transport Minister, Hajime Morita, to publicly 
chastise the group (BBC, 2000). The response to the scandal from the DaimlerChrysler 
management board was to renegotiate the financial terms of the merger downwards. The 
cost of the 34% stake in the Japanese firm was reduced from $2.1 billion to just  
$1.9 billion. 
Table 1 Profit and loss account Mitsubishi Motor Corporation: (billion yen) 
Year Profit loss 
2000 (278) 
2001 11.2 
2002 37 
2003 (215) 
2004 (474.8) 
2005 (92.2) 
Source: Adapted from Paul (2008) 
It was recognised that Mitsubishi stood in need of turnaround strategy and to this end, 
Rolf Eckrodt, a senior Daimler manager who had been instrumental in turning around 
Daimler’s Adtranz rail technology subsidiary, was quickly appointed as chief operating 
officer at Mitsubishi Motors and dispatched to Japan to affect a turnaround via crisis 
management, improve the company’s image and transform its position through new 
model development in the small car segments. Eckrodt, however was disadvantaged in 
that his powers were limited. DaimlerChrysler were only minority shareholders in 
Mitsubishi as its main board membership was limited to three. Moreover, Eckrodt had to 
report to a Japanese Chairman and so did not have full operational control. Aware of the 
depth of the problems, Eckrodt, nevertheless, succeeded in reducing costs by: reducing 
the headcount by 9,500 from a total of 65,000; closing one factory to reduce capacity 
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under-utilisation by 20%; by initiating a programme to cut material costs by 15% by 
2003; and reducing the number of platforms by 50% (Paul, 2008). 
Eckrodt’s policy was based on encouraging Mitsubishi to move away from a culture 
of engineering dominance to one of being market led in developing new models to be 
shared with Chrysler. Efforts were made at integration through the planned development 
of a new plant at Kolleda in Germany. Additionally plans were put in place with Hyundai 
to establish The Global Manufacturing Alliance in five factories across the globe with a 
total capacity to turn out two million power trains per annum to complement anticipated 
platform sharing and cross supply agreements. Little of this came to fruition as 
Mitsubishi’s profits continued to slide downwards and generally post merger integration 
strategy failed (Schmid, 2001). However, the plight of the Asian wing of the 
conglomerate was not the only concern for German management. 
The second simultaneous problem threatening the new DaimlerChrysler group was 
the poor performance of its American unit, whose shortcomings were creating headaches 
for its German partner. When the DaimlerChrysler merger had been broached in 1998 the 
US firm was at the top of the US market. Within two years, however, it had spiraled 
deeply into crisis, racking up $4.7 billion in operating losses by 2001 as a result of fierce 
domestic and foreign competition in the light truck and sports utility vehicle (SUV) 
market on which it was over dependent, a situation that was not helped by heavy price 
discounting. In 2000 a Daimler veteran Dieter Zetsch was dispatched to USA with a 
remit to turn Chrysler around. Immediately Zetsch attacked the problem of excessive 
costs by cutting 25,000 operatives and idling six plants to improve capacity utilisation 
(Gomes et al., 2010 forthcoming) As Juergen Pieper, an auto analyst with Metzler Bank 
in Frankfurt, noted: 
“Chrysler had done almost everything right for a couple of years, and they were 
simply too slow in reacting to the competition that moved into their markets.” 
(quoted in Greimel, 2000) 
In addition to their slow reaction to encroaching competition from both indigenous and 
US produced Japanese products, particularly in the area of minivans and SUVs, the 
company had reached a plateau in its truck sales. However, competition alone did not 
account for the decline in Chrysler’s fortunes. Chrysler products also had a reputation for 
poor quality build and excessive fuel consumption that made them increasingly 
unpopular and market share fell (Gomes et al., 2010 forthcoming). 
The result was that German management, faced with both its Western and Eastern 
divisions in difficulties, was now forced to divert its attention to its US-based Chrysler 
arm with less attention being devoted to Mitsubishi and so over stretched its managerial 
resources. This was not helped by Schrempp’s ill-judged comment in 2000, admitting he 
had lied in 1998 to get Chrysler to agree to a business combination with Daimler-Benz. 
He admitted that it had always been his intention to control Chrysler and operate it as a 
division. This prompted DaimlerChrysler’s third largest shareholder, Kirk Kerkorian, to 
bring a federal lawsuit against DaimlerChrysler and senior company executives for 
fraudulently inducing the 1998 vote of Chrysler shareholders (Millet, 2000) In January of 
the following year a disgruntled Kerkorian sold ten million shares in Daimler-Chrysler. 
(Goodman, 2001) The outcome was that the stock price of the DaimlerChrysler that had 
been steadily declining from its 1998 high of $108 dollars now plummeted to $47 dollars 
far below its price at the time of merger, which shook German shareholder confidence 
seriously as all three divisions of the company appeared to be suffering.2 
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In response to what was tantamount to a near crisis situation, Schrempp announced 
plans to restructure both the Chrysler and Mitsubishi units in February of 2001. The 
proposed new strategy involved eliminating thousands of white-collar jobs, cancelling the 
development of marginally profitable vehicles and sharing auto parts between Chrysler 
and Mitsubishi. On 16th March DaimlerChrysler let go about 2,700 salaried workers 
while another 2,285 opted for early retirement. Another 1,800 contract workers were also 
released, bringing the total German cutback to 6,785 (DaimlerChrysler, Annual reports 
and accounts, 1998–2007). 
This recovery plan accepted that DaimlerChrysler would record losses of $2.5 billion 
in 2001 and would take a restructuring charge of $2.8 billion in early 2001. The plan 
expected the group to break even in 2002 and earn a profit of $2 billion in 2003.3 
However, the impact of declining profits and high profile court cases had damaged 
DaimlerChrysler’s image resulting in two of the largest US rating agencies, Standard & 
Poor’s and Moody’s Investors Service, cutting their long-term ratings for 
DaimlerChrysler. Schrempp’s $3.64 billion, three-year recovery plan was put in grave 
danger of derailment (Paul, 2008) 
The seriousness and depth of the three companies’ problems were further 
compounded when Mitsubishi incurred a $454 million provision cost against its 2003 
accounts as a result of default payments on its zero-zero-zero finance offer instigated at 
the beginning of the millennium (Mitsubishi Motors, 2004). The corporate and financial 
difficulties encountered in both the US and Asian arms of the organisation at the cost of 
product rationalisation and new model development, also impacted negatively on 
Daimler’s own domestic operations. As early as 2000, German shareholders voiced their 
concern that Daimler was more of less subsidising Chrysler which by that time was 
already viewed by many German shareholders as a failing enterprise. Daimler’s situation 
was not helped by the fact that BMW had overtaken it in volume of production, while in 
the US market its sales figures had been exceeded by those of Toyota’s Lexus as the best 
selling luxury brand (Power and Boudette, 2005). Forced to squeeze costs to achieve 
greater profits from the group, by July 2003 due to severe competition in Europe, 
Mercedes had fallen to the lower levels of J.D. Power & Associates’ reliability survey as 
a result of corner-cutting on quality and concomitant failures in new hi-tech technology 
applications in its vehicles (Business Week, 2005). The culmination of this was a series of 
recalls of sedans in the Mercedes e-class segment – 680,000 in 2004 and a further  
1.3 million in 2005 which proved highly embarrassing for a luxury premium class 
producer. Finally, problems arose with the Smart. Launched in 1998 in an attempt to raise 
Daimler’s profile in the small city-car segment, the project lost money almost 
continuously. For example, in 2004 on sales of 160,000 units, the company sustained 
losses of over $400,000 (Taylor, 2005). 
The situation for Schrempp and Daimler had become difficult. Having lost $60 billion 
in stock market value in six years and with the company’s net profit for 2003 down 91% 
from the preceding year, the CEO in April 2004 was forced to face down angry 
shareholders who felt that the existence of Daimler itself was being eroded. The 
shareholders and the German media voiced the opinion that the problems in the USA and 
Japan were endangering the very survival of Daimler itself and it was this that heralded 
the beginning of the end for Schrempp’s attempts to create a global firm. Schrempp 
though steadfastly stuck with the view that a global company could be created and argued 
the case for a financial restructuring of Mitsubishi. The Board, however, refused his 
request for a $1.5 billion cash injection for Mitsubishi and took the decision to extricate 
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DaimlerChrysler from its Asian holdings by selling off its shares in both Mitsubishi and 
Hyundai and so abandoned them. This decision opened the route to preserving the 
integrity of Mercedes and ensures its survival as a viable entity. In so doing it ended 
Schrempp’s ambitions; he was left with little alternative but to resign in early 2005  
(Paul, 2008). News of the resignation sent Daimler Benz’s share price soaring by 9% 
adding $4 billion to its market value (Gomes et al., 2010 forthcoming). The Asian 
adventure had ended in a debacle, the dream of a global enterprise ended ignominiously 
and probably paved the way for the subsequent demerger with Chrysler in 2007. 
7 Conclusions 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the failure of the DaimlerChrysler merger with 
Mitsubishi. Intense competition in the car manufacturing sector globally, combined with 
the need for scale and scope, had left Daimler-Benz with few real alternatives to 
Schrempp’s plans for expansion overseas through merger and acquisition and so forestall 
any would-be predators. The two mergers in questions did not happen in isolation. 
German firms generally had been heavily engaged in foreign investment throughout the 
1990s and equally, Schrempp’s global vision was also matched by other automotive 
manufacturers with firms like Ford, Renault, Volkswagen and GM, eschewing organic 
growth and expanding via merger and take-overs. 
Theoretically, therefore, Schrempp’s ambitions for Daimler-Benz made good 
business sense, but specifically in the case of Mitsubishi there does not appear to have 
been a clear post-merger integration strategy, save that the Japanese venture would 
perhaps improve Mercedes prospects in the market of the Far East and that Daimler-Benz 
would benefit from access to small car technology. It could, however, be argued, 
nevertheless, that the decision to enter partnership with an ailing Mitsubishi in 2000, a 
group whose management culture stood in sharp contrast to that of Daimler was a serious 
error of judgement in terms of timing due to the long running recession in the Japanese 
economy. Had Daimler to deal solely with an underperforming Chrysler, the 
haemorrhage of capital and managerial talent from Daimler-Benz to its partners may not 
have proven so serious as the German managerial resource base became seriously 
overstretched. The dual challenge of both a troubled US operation in conjunction with a 
failing Mitsubishi Motors Corporation proved too much. In essence it is legitimate to ask 
whether or not a full evaluation of Mitsubishi had been carried out prior to the merger to 
establish its strengths and weaknesses? Perhaps proof of this can be evidenced by the 
failure to develop an appropriate series of vehicles. 
Perhaps part of the reasoning behind DaimlerChrysler’s decision to acquire 
Mitsubishi can be found outside broad market theories on mergers. Both Vermeulen and 
Barkema (2001) and Seth et al. (2001) have independently posited the idea that mergers 
may also take place when controlling managers are focused on growing their businesses 
rather than on profit maximisation. In this instance the motive for the merger appears to 
lie not just in growth maximisation, but also in augmenting managerial status. The charge 
that Schrempp was acting in this vein would appear somewhat inconclusive. The basic 
rationale behind the deal was sound, even if the timing was poor. Yet, it is difficult to 
escape the suggestion that Schrempp’s force of personality and his desire to achieve his 
ambitions for the group did much to gloss over the potential problems in the deal in 2000. 
The ultimate lessons flowing from this case are the dangers in not having fully thought 
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out post integration strategies, the importance of timing and the consequences of 
stretching resources too thinly in times of economic crisis, especially when the very 
existence of the dominant partner could be threatened. 
References 
Aslinger, P.L. and Copeland, T.E. (1996) ‘Growth through acquisitions: a fresh look’,  
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 74, pp.126–135. 
BBC (2000) ‘Cover-up forces Mitsubishi boss out’, 8 September, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/915615.stm. 
Business Week (1999) ‘Dangerous liaisons’, 24 March, p.48. 
Business Week (2005) ‘Dark days at Daimler’, 15 August. 
Capron, L. (1999) ‘The long term performance of horizontal acquisitions’, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 20, pp.987–1018. 
Cartwright, R. and Schoenberg, S. (2006) ‘Thirty years of mergers and acquisitions research: recent 
advances and future opportunities’, British Journal of Management, March, Vol. 17,  
pp.S1–S5. 
DaimlerChrysler (1998–2007) ‘Annual reports and accounts (online)’. 
Diamond (2000) ‘Foreign investors have gobbled up Japan’, 13 May. 
Dicken, P. (2007) Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy for the 21st Century, Sage, 
London. 
Donnelly, T. and Morris, D. (2003) ‘The Ford Premier automotive group: in search of strategy’, 
CLED, Working paper, Coventry University Business School. 
Donnelly, T., Morris, D. and Donnelly, T. (2004) ‘Renault: from bankruptcy to profit’, Centre 
Innovation Marche Entreprise, Cahier No. 30, IAE, University of Caen. 
Eisenstein, P. (2005) ‘Interview with Juergen Hubbert’, Car Connection, 29 May, available at 
http://www.thecarconnection.com/Auto_News/Daily_Auto_News/Profiles_QA/DCs_Juergen_
Hubbert.S193.A1550.html. 
Ewing, J., Thornton, E. and Kunii, I. (1999) ‘DaimlerChrysler desperately seeking an ally’, 
Business Week, 13 December, available at 
http://www.business.com:1999/99_50/b3659195.htm. 
Ghosn, P. (2002) ‘Saving the business without losing the company’, Harvard Business Review, 
Vol. 80, pp.37–45. 
Gomes, E., Donnelly, T., Collis, C. and Morris, D. (2010 forthcoming) Mergers and Acquisition as 
Strategy Method of Business Development in the World Automotive Industry, Edwin Mellen 
Press, New York. 
Gomes, E., Donnelly, T., Morris, D. and Collis, C. (2007) ‘Improving merger process management 
skills over time: a comparison between the acquisition processes of Jaguar and Land Rover by 
Ford’, Irish Journal of Management, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp.31–47. 
Goodman, D. (2001) ‘Kerkorian dumps 10 million DaimlerChrysler shares’, Associated Press,  
25 January. 
Graebner, M.E. and Eisenhardt, K.M. (2004) ‘The sellers side of the story: acquisition as courtship 
and governance as syndicate in entrepreneurial firms’, Administrative Science Quarterly,  
Vol. 49, pp.366–403. 
Grässlin, J. (2000) Jürgen Schrempp and the Making of an Auto Dynasty, McGraw-Hill, London. 
Greimel, H. (2000) ‘Schrempp digs in as criticism grows’, Associated Press, 4 December. 
Howell, R. (1970) ‘Plan to integrate your acquisitions’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 48, No. 6, 
pp.66–77. 
Jennings, B. (1999) ‘Sharp moves to keep Smart running’, Drive, September. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    The DaimlerChrysler Mitsubishi merger 13    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Millet, M. (2000) ‘Captain Kirk calls in the cleaners’, Drive, 29 November. 
Mitelton-Kelly, E. (2004) ‘Co-evolutionary integration: a complexity perspective on mergers and 
acquisitions’, EGOS Conference, University of Slovenia, Slovenia, July. 
Mitsubishi Motors (1998–2004) Internet repository, Consolidated annual financial results, available 
at http://media.mitsubishi-motors.com/pressrelease/e/corporate/detail304.html. 
Morris, D. and Donnelly, T. (2006) ‘Are there market limits to modularization?’, International 
Journal of Automotive Technology and Management, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp.262–275. 
Nikkei (1998) ‘Chrysler Merger raises eyebrows’, 7 May. 
Paul, H. (2008) ‘Daimler Chrysler, lessons in post-merger integration’, Wirtschaft FH Mainz, 
European Case Clearing House, Cranfied, Casez Reference, 308-295-1. 
Power, S. and Boudette, N. (2005) ‘DaimlerChrysler fixes a unit while another stumbles: fuel for 
merger critics’, The Wall St Journal, 9 February. 
Priddle, A. (2000) ‘Daimler Chrysler/Mitsubishi: a marriage of convenience’, Ward’s Auto World, 
May. 
Prittchett, P., Robinson, D. and Clarkson, R. (1996) After the Merger: the Authoritative Guide for 
Integration Success, McGraw Hill, New York. 
Schmid, J. (2000) ‘Daimler Gets Closer To Mitsubishi Deal’, International Herald Tribune,  
23 April. 
Schmid, J. (2001) ‘The Daimler Puzzle: Is Mitsubishi the Key?’, International Herald Tribune,  
23 February. 
Seth, A., Song, K. and Petit, R. (2001) ‘Synergy, managerialism or hubris? An examination of 
motives for foreign acquisitions of US firms’, Journal of International Business Studies,  
Vol. 31, pp.387–398. 
Taylor, A. (2005) ‘The nine lives of Jürgen Schrempp’, Fortune, 10 January. 
Toyo Keizai (2000) ‘The challenges facing the Honda way’, 13 May. 
Vermeulen, F. and Barkema, H. (2001) ‘Learning through acquisitions’, Academy of Management 
Journal, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp.457–476. 
Week in Germany (1998) ‘Daimler-Benz begins stock transfer to complete merger with Chrysler’, 
25 September. 
Wilmsen, S. (1998) ‘Mitsubishi to pay $3.4 million in harass suit’, The Boston Globe, 6 December. 
Notes 
1 Grässlin quotes the Chrysler figure at 0.547, while the German journal Week in Germany 
quotes the figure used above. Both agree that Chrysler was the loser. 
2 Kerkorian sought more than $2 billion in actual damages (including the acquisition premium 
denied it by the pretense of a merger of equals) and $1 billion in rescissory damages 
(representing the drop in value of the DaimlerChrysler shares exchanged for Tracinda’s 
Chrysler stock). On top of this Kerkorian wanted punitive damages of at least $6 billion to 
punish the defendants for defrauding all Chrysler shareholders and the investing public at 
large. 
3 ‘Nothing down, no interest, no payment for the first year’ had proven a successful campaign in 
the sale of Mitsubishi vehicles. However, when the time came for the first series of 
repayments, defaults on repayment were higher than had been anticipated by the company. 
